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I. Introduction
In an influential piece published by the American Journal of
International Law in 1908, Oppenheim opined that the chief task for
the science of international law was “the exposition of the existing
recognized rules.” 1 He further explained that “[w]hatever we think of
the value of a recognized rule — whether we approve or condemn it,
whether we want to retain, abolish, or replace it — we must first of all
know whether it is really a recognized rule of law at all, and what are
its commands.” 2 Writing in that same journal 75 years later, Weil
strictly distinguished between the prelegal and the legal, and noted that
“on one side of the line, there is born a legal obligation that can be
relied on before a court or arbitrator, the flouting of which constitutes
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1.

Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and
Method, 2 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 313 (1908).

2.

Id. at 314–15.
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an internationally unlawful act giving rise to international
responsibility; on the other side, there is nothing of the kind.” 3
Then, in 2001, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) released
its (Draft) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”) with a truism at its core: “Every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State.” 4 That wrongfulness flows from an act (or
omission) that is attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of
its international obligations. 5 The latter can evidently be ascertained
by “comparing the conduct in fact engaged in by the State with the
conduct legally prescribed by the international obligation.” 6
The point of these fundamental observations is that (one of)
international lawyers’ primary task(s) is to determine with precision
whether contentious State conduct is or is not in accordance with the
edicts of international law and, consequently, does or does not entail
international responsibility. 7 This simple idea has a long and
distinguished pedigree. For example, already in the 19th century, British
uomo universale William Whewell set out to:
contribute to the formation of a strong body of experts on
International Law, distributed among the chief countries of the
world”, such that “every nation would be willing, if not to accept
the general verdict of such experts, at least to hesitate to impute
malignity to another nation whose conduct was declared by the
common opinion of experts in neutral countries to be technically
correct. 8

The point of this article, however, is to argue that such an
undertaking has currently and decidedly taken a back seat in the
international legal academy, given what Jan Klabbers has labelled the
3.

Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 417–18 (1983).

4.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Art.’s on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 32 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA].

5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 55.

7.

Id. at 31–32.

8.

Anne Orford, Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 374 (2014). Whewell was indeed a polymath,
writing profusely on widely diverging topics such as mechanics,
mineralogy, geology, astronomy, political economy, theology, educational
reform, architecture, philosophy of science, history of science and moral
philosophy. Laura J. Snyder, William Whewell, THE STANFORD ENCYC.
OF
PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring Edition, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/whewell/
[perma.cc/HR4F-PLBP].
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“fragmentation of international lawyers” as opposed (or in addition) to
that of international law. 9 While this article is certainly inspired by the
appreciation that such a status quo is indeed a sorry one, it will limit
itself to evidencing that understanding through a single yet revealing
case study: the legality vel non of killing Iranian Major-General Qasem
Soleimani by U.S. drone strikes, and the staggering lack of agreement
on international law’s substance and application in that case by some
of the world’s leading experts.
This article is structured in two main parts. First, it sets out the
facts surrounding the death of Soleimani as reported by media outlets
and widely relied upon by international legal experts. It then delves
into the analysis by no less than 15 of them who co-authored 11 legal
briefs of varying depth. All such briefs tackle, more or less, the same
overarching question: Was the killing of Soleimani by U.S. drone strikes
in conformity with the relevant requirements of international law,
consisting of the jus ad bellum (“JAB”), jus in bello (“JIB”) and
international human rights law (“IHRL”)? 10
However, as noted above, there was little consensus among the
experts — if any. The article hopes to better understand why
international lawyers disagree so spectacularly by comparing and
contrasting the variety of views in the Soleimani-case and stripping
down the supporting argumentation to uncover the underlying
(theoretical and methodological) approach. The article’s second part
will tackle that preliminary examination. The root of the problem
indeed appears to lie in a different methodological approach to the same
issue, which includes relying on different sources and/or interpreting
the same sources differently. Add to that the law’s supposed
indeterminacy, the absence of an authoritative arbiter, and
contemporary academic idiosyncrasies, and it becomes clear(er) why
each interpretation of international law is seemingly allowed to stand.
The article ends with some final reflections. Generally, it hopes to
spark a much-needed debate by identifying a worrying trend in
international law and taking a swing at offering preliminary
explanations, rather than present a definitive solution. After all, if the
“invisible college of international lawyers” 11 cannot decide on the
disputed legality of a State unapologetically taking out the military
brass of its archenemy on the territory of a neutral country, it is difficult
to see what remains of the prohibition on the use of force — the
cornerstone of the Charter of the United Nations and international law
more broadly.
9.

Jan Klabbers, On Epistemic Universalism and the Melancholy of
International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1057, 1062 (2019).

10.

See generally Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International
Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217 (1977).

11.

Id. at 217–18.
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II. Case study: The killing of Qasem Soleimani
A. Facts and context

On Friday, January 3, 2020 at 12:47 AM, American MQ-9 Reaper
drones struck a convoy leaving Baghdad International Airport in Iraq,
killing ten individuals. 12 Among the dead were Iranian Major-General
Qasem Soleimani, chief of the Quds Force and one of the most powerful
men in Iran, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, de facto leader of the Iraqi
Popular Mobilisation Forces and founder of the Kataib Hezbollah
(“KH”) militia. 13 Five days later, Iran responded with missile attacks
on the Ain Al Asad air base, used by American forces to train Iraqi
soldiers, causing traumatic brain injury to more than 100 U.S.
servicemen. 14 Just hours after that, the Iranian military — on high alert
for American counteractions — accidentally shot down a Ukrainian
passenger plane on its way to Kyiv from Tehran, killing all 176 on
board. 15
Rising tensions between the United States and Iran over the
previous two years culminated in that deadly week in early January.
These tensions started with the U.S. withdrawal on May 8, 2018 from
the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and its policy of
maximum pressure ever since. 16 They included several incidents in 2019,
12.

Peter Baker, Ronen Bergman, David D. Kirkpatrick, Julian E. Barnes &
Alissa J. Rubin, Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and
Iran to the Brink of War, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/irantrump.html?auth=linked-google [https://perma.cc/A9G2-ADNN].

13.

Id.; Matthew S. Schwartz, Who Was the Iraqi Commander Also Killed in
the Baghdad Drone Strike?, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020, 10:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793618490/who-was-the-iraqicommander-also-killed-in-baghdad-drone-strike [perma.cc/U7SG-CGN9].

14.

Iran Launches Missile Attacks on US Facilities in Iraq, AL JAZEERA (Jan.
8, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/rockets-fired-iraqbase-housing-troops-reports-200107232445101.html [https://perma.cc/FL5BEYE4]; Bill Chappell, 109 U.S. Troops Suffered Brain Injuries in Iran
Strike, Pentagon Says, NPR (Feb. 11, 2020, 10:39 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/11/804785515/109-u-s-troops-sufferedbrain-injuries-in-iran-strike-pentagon-says?t=1597833845065
[https://perma.cc/VUU6-NUB3].

15.

Iran Plane Crash: Ukrainian Jet Was ‘Unintentionally’ Shot Down, BBC
(Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51073621
[https://perma.cc/TD79-RAY3].

16.

Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis & Thomas Clayton, U.S.-Iran
Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (May 8,
2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45795.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KBK-9Z2H]; Six Charts that Show How Hard US
Sanctions Have Hit Iran, BBC (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109
[https://perma.cc/252G-K2MN].

166

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Killing Qasem Soleimani: International Lawyers Divided and Conquered

allegedly caused by one of the protagonists, such as damaging oil
tankers in the Gulf of Oman, shooting down an American drone near
the Strait of Hormuz, disabling Iranian tracking equipment through
cyber-operations and destroying Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure
sites. 17
The temperature rose even further in December 2019. First, Iranallied forces launched indirect fire attacks against Iraqi military
facilities where U.S. troops were stationed. 18 During one of those attacks
on a base near Kirkuk on December 27, 2019 , a U.S. contractor was
killed and several American and Iraqi soldiers wounded. 19 The U.S.
responded two days later by targeting five facilities in Iraq and Syria
— used by Kataib Hezbollah, to which the attacks were attributed —
killing 25 militia members and wounding 55 more. 20 Finally, at the turn
of the year, enraged militia supporters stormed and entered the U.S.
embassy compound in Baghdad, setting fire to some of its buildings.21
17.

Saudi Arabia Calls for ‘Decisive’ Action over Tanker Attacks, AL
JAZEERA (June 15, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-renews-ultimatumnuclear-deal-oil-tanker-tensions-190615090730002.html
[https://perma.cc/84HA-6VGY]; Nasser Karimi & Jon Gambrell, Iran
Shoots Down US Surveillance Drone, Heightening Tensions, AP NEWS
(June 20, 2019),
https://apnews.com/e4316eb989d5499c9828350de8524963
[https://perma.cc/L74K-A94U]; Tami Abdollah, AP Sources: US Struck
Iranian Military Computers This Week, AP NEWS (June 23, 2019),
https://apnews.com/f01492c3dbd14856bce41d776248921f
[https://perma.cc/89MK-WZRS]; Special Report: ‘Time to Take Out Our
Swords’ – Inside Iran’s Plot to Attack Saudi Arabia, REUTERS (Nov. 25,
2019, 6:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramcoattacks-iran-special-rep/special-reporttime-to-take-out-our-swords-insideirans-plot-to-attack-saudi-arabia-idUSKBN1XZ16H
[https://perma.cc/LYT6-B77U].

18.

Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, & Clayton Thomas, U.S.-Iran
Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 8 (May
8, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45795.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KBK-9Z2H].

19.

Id.

20.

Idrees Ali & Ahmed Rasheed, Trump Aides Call U.S. Strikes on Iraq
and Syria ‘Successful,’ Warn of Potential Further Action, REUTERS
(Dec. 29, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraqsecurity-usa/trump-aides-call-u-s-strikes-on-iraq-and-syria-successfulwarn-of-potential-further-action-idUSKBN1YX0GR
[https://perma.cc/J2KA-GFXR].

21.

US-Iran Tensions: Timeline of Events Leading to Soleimani Killing, AL
JAZEERA (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iran-tensions-timeline-eventsleading-soleimani-killing-200103152234464.html [https://perma.cc/SX3L7HCF]; Mustafa Salim & Liz Sly, Supporters of Iranian-backed Militia
End Siege of U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2020, 5:30
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These militia members withdrew on January 1, 2020, leading U.S.
President Donald Trump to tweet in his familiar bellicose style:The
U.S. Embassy in Iraq is, & has been for hours, SAFE! Many of our
great Warfighters, together with the most lethal military equipment in
the world, was immediately rushed to the site. Thank you to the
President & Prime Minister of Iraq for their rapid response upon
request … Iran will be held fully responsible for lives lost, or damage
incurred, at any of our facilities. They will pay a very BIG PRICE!
This is not a Warning, it is a Threat. Happy New Year! 22 We now know
that threat was no mere bluster. In fact, the decision to opt for the
most extreme military option and take out Soleimani was made in the
following hours. 23
B. A comparative overview of expert analysis

The growing antagonism between Iran and the United States
provides the crucial context for a better understanding of the killing of
General Soleimani — including, importantly, from a legal point of view.
The following sections set out the analysis on the legality of the targeted
drone strikes as carried out by 15 experts. 24 The article will carefully
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/supporters-of-iranianbacked-militia-start-withdrawing-from-besieged-us-embassy-in-baghdadfollowing-militia-orders/2020/01/01/8280cb34-2c9e-11ea-9b60817cc18cf173_story.html [https://perma.cc/SSM8-VKHA].
22.

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2019, 10:19
PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1212121012151689217
[https://perma.cc/HQ3B-97EZ].

23.

Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Maggie Haberman & Rukmini Callimachi,
As Tensions with Iran Escalated, Trump Opted for Most Extreme
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/politics/trumpsuleimani.html [https://perma.cc/UQS6-4WUS]. See also Carol E. Lee &
Courtney Kube, Trump Authorized Soleimani’s Killing 7 Months Ago,
with Conditions, NBC (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/trump-authorizedsoleimani-s-killing-7-months-ago-conditionsn1113271?cid=sm_npd_ms_tw_ma&fbclid=IwAR0Dig5n8E7zkx_7uKs
QYndCOoEbseWMleomJhN6ZFoJ6q3JqRfmxQqOgpo
[https://perma.cc/53RN-HC9R].

24.

See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Killing of Soleimani and
International Law, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-killing-of-soleimani-and-internationallaw/?fbclid=IwAR3zRXtyYlUr9W7VDLIDZJDK419WjADuGyQnX5CU
Aljri7q1YnzhoLPLerY [https://perma.cc/74CY-KN25]; Marko Milanovic,
The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed
Attack, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/thesoleimani-strike-and-self-defence-against-an-imminent-armed-attack/
[https://perma.cc/FG27-GYMV] [hereinafter Milanovic I]; Marko Milanovic,
Iran Unlawfully Retaliates Against the United States, Violating Iraqi

168

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Killing Qasem Soleimani: International Lawyers Divided and Conquered

avoid taking a position in that legal debate, but rather will provide a
helicopter view thereof.
On a preliminary note, an author’s position vis-à-vis a subsection
of international law will not be taken into account unless (s)he has
taken an explicit position on the lex lata in the Soleimani-case — the
law as it is, as opposed to the lex ferenda or the law as it ought to be
— and expanded upon it in some depth. 25 In addition, the expressed
Sovereignty in the Process, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/iran-unlawfully-retaliates-against-the-unitedstates-violating-iraqi-sovereignty-in-the-process/ [https://perma.cc/5ESKNBVB] [hereinafter Milonovic II]; Adil Ahmad Haque, U.S. Legal Defense
of the Soleimani Strike at the United Nations: A Critical Assessment,
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68008/us-legal-defense-of-the-soleimani-strike-at-the-united-nations-a-criticalassessment/ [https://perma.cc/2DD5-T46H]; Alonso Gurmendi, The
Soleimani Case and the Last Nail in the Lex Specialis Coffin,
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 13, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/13/thesoleimani-case-and-the-last-nail-in-the-lex-specialis-coffin/
[https://perma.cc/5RJN-NW4F]; Patryk I. Labuda, The Killing of
Soleimani, the Use of Force against Iraq and Overlooked Ius ad Bellum
Questions, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/thekilling-of-soleimani-the-use-of-force-against-iraq-and-overlooked-ius-adbellumquestions/?fbclid=IwAR22CyMwDDv9zRUNJSdiN8dWMyEUJVdH5xa3T9ddKA_r3naToVvNLICCc0 [https://perma.cc/UC77-B83Q]; Olivier
Corten et al., The Crisis Between Iran, Iraq and the United States in
January 2020: What Does International Law Say?, CENTRE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 15, 2020), http://cdi.ulb.ac.be/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Iran.US_.Iraq_.EN_.Final_-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JD2C-L934]; Ralph Janik, Soleimani and Targeted
Killings of Enemy Combatants — Part I: Revisiting the “First Shot”–
Theory, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 20, 2020),
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/20/soleimani-and-targeted-killings-ofenemy-combatants-part-i-revisiting-the-first-shot-theory/
[https://perma.cc/K7ES-J5ZC]; Geoffrey S. Corn & Chris Jenks, Soleimani
and the Tactical Execution of Strategic Self-Defense, LAWFARE (Jan.
24, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/soleimani-andtactical-execution-strategic-self-defense [https://perma.cc/7E4P-AFM6];
Stefan Talmon & Miriam Heipertz, The U.S. Killing or Iranian General
Qasem Soleimani: Of Wrong Trees and Red Herrings, and Why the
Killing May Be Lawful After All, GPIL (Feb. 2, 2020)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3530273
[https://perma.cc/DDF3-BK8P]; Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Annex: The Targeted
Killing of General Soleimani, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/38 (June 29, 2020).
25.

For example, this excludes incidental commentary to news outlets or even
the otherwise insightful debate between five renowned experts (Ashley
Deeks, Jack Goldsmith, Samuel Moyn, Bobby Chesney and Scott
Anderson) in a podcast-episode on the Lawfare-website. See Mikhalia
Fogel, The Lawfare Podcast Special Edition: Law and the Soleimani
PODCAST
(Jan.
6,
2020),
Strike,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-special-edition-law-and-
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views will be treated in isolation, meaning that an author’s previous
scholarship will not feature in the discussion below. That discussion
proceeds thematically, setting out points of (dis)agreement between the
experts on issues of the jus ad bellum (section 2.2.1) and jus in bello
(section 2.2.2). Generally, 7 out of 15 experts carried out a
comprehensive legal review of the military action (in three separate
opinions). 26 Four others focused primarily on JAB-issues, while two
more zoomed in on the relationship between JIB and IHRL. 27 The final
two discussed the interplay between JIB and JAB, but concentrated on
the former. 28
As for the most basic question — spoiler alert! — 11 commentators
argued that the drone strikes (likely) violated one or more rules of
international law, a conclusion with which only two explicitly
disagreed. 29 The final two experts under review chose not to engage
with all legal questions, 30 making it impossible to discern their position
on the legality of the military action as a whole. Nevertheless, they did
opine that Soleimani qualified as a legitimate military target. 31
1. Were the drone strikes in conformity with the jus ad bellum?

A first JAB-issue concerns the proactive U.S. argument that it had
“taken decisive defensive action . . . by killing Qasem Soleimani”
because he was “plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American
soleimani-strike [https://perma.cc/LV7W-8T45]. That discussion set out
the relevant legal questions but did not (attempt to) answer them nor
tackle the finer points of the law in much detail. Alonso Gurmendi,
Raising Questions on Targeted Killings as First Strikes in IACs,
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 9, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/09/raisingquestions-on-targeted-killings-as-first-strikes-in-iacs/
[https://perma.cc/2ZJ4-VKKP] (“Yes. The American strike against
Qassem Soleimani was illegal. This is the common conclusion of some of
the world’s best experts on international law and jus ad bellum.”). Given
the comment’s brevity, and the fact that the three experts referred to
(i.e., Milanovic (twice), Callamard and Haque) do not agree on each
relevant issue, Gurmendi is not counted as one of the experts commenting
on the jus ad bellum for the purposes of this article, see generally id.
26.

See generally Corten et al., supra note 24; Talmon & Heipertz, supra note
24; Callamard, supra note 24.

27.

Compare O’Connell, supra note 24; Milanovic I, supra note 24; Haque,
supra note 24, and Labuda, supra note 24, with Gurmendi, supra note 24,
and Janik, supra note 24.

28.

See generally Corn & Jenks, supra note 24; Talmon & Heipertz, supra
note 24.

29.

Compare O’Connell, supra note 24, Milanovic I, supra note 24, Haque,
supra note 24, Gurmendi, supra note 24, Labuda, supra note 24, Corten
et al., supra note 24, Janik, supra note 24, and Callamard, supra note 24,
with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24.

30.

Corn & Jenks, supra note 24.

31.

Id.
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diplomats and military personnel.” 32 That raises the question of legality
concerning so-called preemptive self-defense against imminent armed
attacks, understood as attacks that have not yet begun. This reveals a
first schism between commentators.
On one side are the experts who consider that “the law does not
permit the use of military force to respond to an alleged plan to attack
in the future” and note that “no international court or tribunal has ever
endorsed the argument.” 33 On the other we find those who do not reject
outright a more expansive interpretation in case the situation
“necessitates immediate defensive action to successfully repel” an
imminent attack, even if that attack is not (yet) “about to occur.”34
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions Agnes Callamard appears to occupy the middle ground by
relying on the famous Caroline-formulation, suggesting that “a State
can defend itself against a current, ongoing attack as well as an attack
that is imminent, where the attack is ‘instant, overwhelming and
leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation.’” 35
However, all of the experts commenting on the jus ad bellum
harbored doubts about whether the facts were sufficient to meet even
32.

U.S., Dept. of Defense, Statement by the Department of Defense (Jan. 2,
2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/
statement-by-the-department-of-defense/ [https://perma.cc/BHV4-WRTW];
Mark Hosenball, Trump Says Soleimani Plotted ‘Imminent’ Attacks, but
Critics Question Just How Soon, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2020, 5:56 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blastintelligence/trump-says-soleimani-plotted-imminent-attacks-but-criticsquestion-just-how-soon-idUSKBN1Z228N [https://perma.cc/FL3Z-55KV].

33.

O’Connell, supra note 244; Corten et al., supra note 244, at 11.

34.

Milanovic I, supra note 244; Corn & Jenks, supra note 244. Alternatively,
Talmon and Heipertz considered commentators had simply been “barking
up the wrong tree,” since the imminence-argument was “something of a
red herring.” Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 6–7. See also Masood
Farivar & Ken Bredemeier, US Attorney General Calls Imminence of
Iranian Threat ‘a Red Herring’, VOA NEWS (Jan. 13, 2020, 7:35 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/us-attorneygeneral-calls-imminence-iranian-threat-red-herring [https://perma.cc/3FA8PVPC].

35.

Callamard, supra note 244, annex ¶ 54; Christopher Greenwood, The
Caroline, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Apr. 2009) (emphasis added),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e261?rskey=aOGXHq&result=1&prd=OPIL
[https://perma.cc/YV7K-GYRK]. See also Labuda, supra note 24. (“As
with the killing of Soleimani, the US would need to show that Iraq –
specifically Kata’ib Hezbollah – was planning imminent attacks against
the US.”). While he therefore seems to accept self-defense against an
armed attack that has not yet begun, it was not the crux of his
contribution. It is therefore difficult to definitively place him in either
camp.
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the threshold set by a broad interpretation of the right to preemptive
self-defense. 36 As always, Milanovic eloquently hit that point home:
The Soleimani strike is thus … is imminently unlawful. The lack
of any specific details provided publicly and the disclosure of US
intelligence that goes against US interests cast serious doubts on
whether the various factual predicates for lawful self-defence
could be met even on a generous appraisal of the facts. Similarly,
the deterrence rationale for killing Soleimani, even if admissible
in principle, collapses under the weight of its own failure, a failure
that was easily foreseeable. 37

A second JAB-issue relates to the reactive U.S. argument that it
had undertaken military action not (only) to defend against future
armed attacks, but rather “in response to an escalating series of armed
attacks in recent months by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iransupported militias on United States forces and interests in the Middle
East region.” 38 According to U.S. officials, this included several
incidents in 2019: (1) the Iranian take-down of an American MQ-4
drone in June; 39 (2) a threat to the U.S.S. Boxer posed by an Iranian
drone in July; 40 (3) multiple rocket attacks by the “Qods Force-backed”
Kataib Hezbollah against Iraqi bases hosting U.S. personnel in
November; 41 and (4) the aforementioned 42 military exchanges on Iraqi
(and Syrian) soil in December and (early) January 2020. Moreover, and
still according to the U.S., this series of attacks took place in the context
of other threats to international peace and security by Iran, including
36.

See Milanovic I, supra note 24; O’Connell, supra note 24; Haque, supra
note 24; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 10; Callamard, supra note 24,
annex ¶ 64.

37.

Milanovic I, supra note 244; see Permanent Rep. of the United States of
America to the U.N., Letter dated Jan. 8, 2020 from the Permanent Rep.
of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2020/20 (Jan. 9, 2020) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
S/2020/20]; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 10 (“on a purely factual basis,
the United States has in no way shown that an imminent attack was
planned by General Soleimani”); Callamard, supra note 24, annex ¶ 64
(“the US should have brought this evidence, in a form that protected its
sources, to the Security Council for public examination. Otherwise, Art.
51 becomes a convenient excuse for any use of force at the whims of a
State against another State.”); see also O’Connell, supra note 24; Haque,
supra note 24 (“The U.S. letter . . . fails to allege imminent future armed
attacks by Iran.”).

38.

U.N. Doc. S/2020/20, supra note 377, at 1.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

See Iran Plane Crash, supra note 15; Katzman, McInnis & Clayton, supra
note 16.
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against Saudi Arabia (through its Yemeni proxies) and international
commerce. 43 Since this argument did not feature in the rapid response
U.S. justifications, and no one is “entitled to ascribe to States legal
views which they do not themselves formulate,” 44 early commentators
understandably did not address it. 45
Those who did could again be divided in two camps. In the first we
find Haque who indicated that “the last incident in this series was over
when the U.S. decided to strike.” 46 Accordingly, this “dooms the United
States’ legal case” since if “one attack is clearly over, then the legal
‘clock’ resets. If no further attack is imminent, then there is nothing to
lawfully defend against.” 47 While he leaves room for the possibility of
defending against an “ongoing armed attack that was, if you will,
arriving in waves,” he closes that door here: “an ongoing series of
attacks is not an ongoing attack.” 48
Much of that argument was endorsed (at times verbatim) by the
UN Special Rapporteur, who agreed that “these attacks, to the extent
that they were directed against the United States, had all concluded in
the past.” 49 And while she too admitted that “a series of attacks,
collectively, could amount to an armed attack,” the attacks referred to
were, on the contrary, “separate and distinct … , not necessarily
escalating, … not related in time or even targets.” 50 Moreover, even in
the latter case proof would be required of “further imminent attack” to
avoid blurring the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. 51 As such, while both authors cautiously accepted self-defense
43.

U.N. Doc. S/2020/20, supra note 37, at 1; Hon. Paul C. Ney, Jr., General
Counsel of the Dept. of Defense, Legal Considerations Related to the U.S.
Air Strike Against Qassem Soleimani (Mar. 4, 2020); NOTICE ON THE
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE
OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
(2020).

44.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 266 (June 27).

45.

See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 24; Milanovic, supra note 244.

46.

Haque, supra note 24.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.; see also Adil Ahmad Haque, The Trump Administration’s Latest
(Failed) Attempt to Justify the Soleimani Strike, JUST SECURITY (Mar.
13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69163/the-trumpadministrations-latest-failed-attempt-to-justify-the-soleimani-strike/
[https://perma.cc/NMS4-YZHP].

49.

Callamard, supra note 244, annex ¶ 61.

50.

Id. annex ¶ 57.

51.

Id. annex ¶¶ 62–63. Callamard continues by stating “[t]he existence of
previous attacks could be a legal argument for the legality of the use of
force under international humanitarian law – if an international armed
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against an ongoing attack that comes in different installments (or
waves), 52 they appeared to interpret very strictly the time lapse
between the last such installment and the military action in defense.
The second camp belongs to those who unapologetically endorse
the “accumulation of events-doctrine” (the Nadelstichtaktik or needleprick theory), 53 but applied it differently here. Indeed, one co-authored
legal opinion puts forth that “[i]t is generally accepted that a series of
limited attacks, taken in isolation, can amount to an armed attack when
considered as a whole.” 54 However, rather than relying on the fact that
the last incident targeting the U.S. had definitively ended, the authors
denied the doctrine’s application for three (other) reasons: (1) the case
facts differed substantively from the precedents upon which the
doctrine is based; (2) the U.S. already responded military on December
29, thereby exhausting the possibility of again invoking the doctrine a
few days later; and (3) a lack of “precise identification and evidence”
with regard to a connection between the incidents. 55
Another co-authored piece pointed out that the accumulation of
events doctrine required the successive attacks to be “linked in time,
cause and source.” 56 In the case at hand, and in opposition to their
colleagues cited earlier, they found that the multiple attacks on U.S.
troops and installations in Iraq met that criterion and thus constituted
an armed attack on the United States. 57 Moreover, the authors argued
that in such a scenario, unlike in the case of anticipatory self-defense,
“prospective armed attacks must not be imminent” as it is “more
difficult to assess whether a series of attacks is continuing or whether
it has come to an end with the latest attack.” 58 They approvingly
conflict between the states existed prior to the strike. However, the strike
itself cannot be justified on the basis of retaliation/reprisal/degrading
forces under jus ad bellum.” Id. annex ¶ 63.
52.

Haque, supra note 24; Callamard, supra note 24, annex ¶ 57.

53.

J. Francisco Lobo, One Piece at a Time: The ‘Accumulation of Events’
Doctrine and the ‘Bloody Nose’ Debate on North Korea, LAWFARE (Mar.
16, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-piece-timeaccumulation-events-doctrine-and-bloody-nose-debate-north-korea
[https://perma.cc/7RQS-QBWC].

54.

Corten et al., supra note 244, at 7.

55.

Id. at 7–9; see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 231 (June 27);
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6);
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. U.S.), 2005
I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19). The last reason does echo the views of
Callamard. See Callamard, supra note 24.

56.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 8. But see Callamard, supra note
24, §63; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 7.

57.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 8.

58.

Id. at 10.
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quoted the U.S. Attorney-General’s interpretation on that point,
thereby fully disagreeing with authors in the first camp. 59
A third JAB-issue deals with the question of whether the United
States was entitled to engage in defensive action against an attack, or
a series of attacks, carried out by Iran through its proxy forces in Iraq.
All commentators dealing with this issue accepted that a State can be
responsible for the actions of its proxy under international law. 60 Most
refer to the complete and/or effective control tests as the relevant
standards, although one confusingly also mentions the overall controltest. 61 The latter was once considered a more lenient (rival) test, but
has been authoritatively rejected by the International Court of Justice
— at least for the purpose of attributing actions by a non-State actor
to its sponsor. 62
Relying on the language of the official U.S. justification in its letter
to the U.N. Security Council, Haque and Callamard both squarely state
that attacks by “Iran-supported militias” could not be attributed to
Iran on that basis alone, even if proven (quod non). 63 Other authors at
least left open the possibility that the link between Kataib Hezbollah
and Iran went beyond mere material support, 64 with some going even
further than that: “Considering KH’s close ties to Iran, their open
pledge of loyalty to Iran and the regular meetings with General
Soleimani, there may be evidence that Iran through its Quds Force
planned, ordered and controlled the KH attacks on U.S. forces in
Iraq.” 65 While there was thus agreement on this aspect of the law,
commentators nevertheless disagreed on its application to the facts.
A fourth and final JAB-issue centers on the location of the
Soleimani-killing: the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. 66 Milanovic succinctly
described the opposing positions on this matter:
[Any] justification would have to work against both Iran and Iraq,
because the strike took place on Iraqi territory without the
59.

See Farivar & Bredemeier, supra note 34.

60.

Corten et al., supra note 24, at 6.

61.

Haque, supra note 24; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 6; Talmon &
Heipertz, supra note 24, at 8–9. But see Callamard, supra note 244, ¶ 60.

62.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 396–407 (Feb. 27); see
ARSIWA, supra note 4, at 40–54; see generally Antonio Cassese, The
Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 (2007).

63.

Haque, supra note 244; Callamard, supra note 244, ¶ 60 (citing U.N. Doc.
S/2020/20, supra note 377, at 1).

64.

Corten et al., supra note 244, at 6.

65.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 9.

66.

O’Connell, supra note 24.
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consent of the Iraqi government. Pursuant to restrictivist theories
of self-defence, such an argument would be a non-starter … Iraq
was not implicated in any imminent attacks against the US. For
expansionists, this situation would be analogous to self-defence
against non-state actors — using force on the territory of the state
in which the attacker is located would need to be justified by the
necessity of stopping the attack, e.g. pursuant to an unwilling or
unable theory. 67

Restrictivist scholars indeed firmly reject military action against a
State simply because the latter fails to prevent its territory from being
used as a launching pad for harmful operations against the acting
State. 68 Even if the U.S. was successful in arguing self-defense for action
taken against Iran, it therefore irreparably failed to justify that
defensive action on Iraqi soil. 69
Expansionists, however, accept that the “unwilling or unable-test”
may provide a justificatory route for the United States. 70 There appears
to be two competing versions of that argument. The first, according to
Labuda, is that self-defense may be invoked to justify the use of force
“against non-state actors operating in the territory of non-consenting
states who refuse (unwilling) or do not have the military/law
enforcement capabilities (unable) to eliminate a threat originating in
their territory.” 71 Applied by analogy to the case at hand, according to
Milanovic, “the US would need to demonstrate that it had to strike at
Soleimani when and where it did, that it could not ask the Iraqi
government for permission (e.g. on the basis of its collusion with Iran)
and that it could not wait to strike at Soleimani elsewhere.” 72 Both
Labuda and Milanovic then tackle the theory on its own merits, without
67.

Milanovic I, supra note 244.

68.

Corten et al., supra note 24, at 8–9; see also O’Connell, supra note 244
(“In the event the Iraqis failed to take adequate steps, the U.S. can keep
its people safe by evacuating them from Iraq.”); see Olivier Corten, A
Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence as a Response to
Terrorism, EJIL:TALK! (July 14, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-pleaagainst-the-abusive-invocation-of-self-defence-as-a-response-to-terrorism/
[https://perma.cc/YM5H-5V4W].

69.

However, this assumes that KH, as part of the Popular Mobilisation
Forces, had not (yet) been fully integrated into the Iraqi army. See Corten
et al., supra note 244, at 8–9. Compare Callamard, supra note 244, § 70,
with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 14 (“The situation here is . .
. one of a State organ being placed at the disposal of another State. Rather
than being so placed by the Iraqi Government, though, KH placed itself
at the disposal of Iran. In this case, the conduct of KH can be considered
only an act of Iran.”).

70.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 16.

71.

Labuda, supra note 24.

72.

Milanovic I, supra note 244.
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thereby supporting it, 73 but both conclude that doing so is
unsatisfactory — given the absurd legal consequences 74 and because the
U.S. did not discharge its evidentiary burden. 75
Similarly, Special Rapporteur Callamard noted that support for
the doctrine is decidedly mixed, but has nevertheless been used
by States to justify the use of military force. 76 Be that as it may,
she denied that the doctrine could apply in the Soleimani-case for
three reasons: (1) the ‘threat’ to be neutralized was a high-level
State official prone to international travel, which would absurdly
imply he could be targeted anywhere in the world; (2) many of
the alleged attacks against the U.S. did not concern Iraq, nor was
it suggested that Iraq was the intended location of one that was
imminent; (3) there was no evidence that Iraq was unable or
unwilling to cooperate, given its continued support in the fight
against Islamic State and the absence of consultation prior to the
drone strike. 77

Finally, Talmon and Heipertz put forth a different conception of
unable or unwilling. They first discarded the former conception as
“highly controversial and prone to abuse,” thereby seemingly agreeing
with the restrictivist point of view. 78 They then relied on the test’s
“original, so-to-speak” incarnation to preclude the wrongfulness of the
use of force in trilateral, inter-State relations: “Where a neutral or nonbelligerent State (Iraq) does not fulfil its duties — is unable or unwilling
— a belligerent (the United States) is permitted to use force in selfdefence on the territory of that State against the enemy (Iran).”79
According to the authors, that understanding has long since been
accepted — or was at least left open by the International Law
Commission in its ARSIWA. 80 It was moreover repeatedly alluded to

73.

See Labuda supra note 24 (noting that the better view is that this
controversial doctrine is rejected by most states).

74.

Id. (arguing that applying the doctrine in a situation where the acting
State is already operating in the territorial State with the latter’s
permission effectively hollows out the ius ad bellum notion of consent).

75.

Milanovic I, supra note 244.

76.

Callamard, supra note 244, ¶¶ 72–3.

77.

Id. ¶¶ 73–8. Haque, supra note 244 (noting that only clear evidence of an
ongoing or imminent armed attack by Iran could justify the use of armed
force in Iraq). However, it is unclear what justification beyond preemptive self-defense against Iran he would accept for defensive action in
Iraq). See generally id.

78.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 15.

79.

Id. at 16.

80.

Id. at 14.
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by U.S. officials when pointing to Iraq’s failure in protecting U.S. troops
on its territory. 81
In sum, commentators disagreed on whether the right to selfdefense justifies military action against attacks that have not yet begun
(or are not even about to), although none accepted that the U.S. met
the evidentiary burden of even the most expansive interpretation.
Moreover, while all of them accepted the accumulation of events theory,
some authors argued that the attacks had ended and none were
imminent, whereas others argued the exact opposite. The latter group
then disagreed about the sufficiency of the connectivity of the past
attacks to allow the doctrine to come into play. In addition, there was
no consensus on the nature of the relationship between Kataib
Hezbollah and Iran for the purpose of attributing acts of the former to
the latter, thereby (possibly) justifying taking out Soleimani as the
group’s alleged Hintermann. To top it all off, there were varying views
on the status and substance of the unwilling or unable-test as part of
the right to self-defense, as well as on whether Iraq fulfilled either
criteria.
Consequently, besides agreeing on the obvious fact that the Trump
administration failed in convincingly supporting an already tenuous
legal argument, the strikes’ accordance with the jus ad bellum
hopelessly divided international lawyers’ evaluations. 82 As shown in the
preceding paragraphs, the analysis often hinges on the application of
the law to the facts. A different appreciation of the fact pattern
therefore likely influences the final outcome, which is to some extent
unavoidable — especially when commentators offer their views even as
the story is still unfolding.
Much more worrisome, however, is the extent of disagreement on
many applicable legal standards: is defensive military action against
imminent armed attacks allowed under international law? Does
imminence (exclusively) consist of a temporal element or rather (also)
include aspects of necessity and causality? Is imminence conceptualized
in the same way for self-defense against a single armed attack compared
to a series of pinprick attacks, or does the legal ‘clock’ then tick more
slowly? At what point of interconnectedness should we view such a
series of attacks holistically? And as for the unwilling or unable-test as
part of the right to self-defense: does it apply in a trilateral, inter-State
situation and/or against non-State actors? Does it constitute the law
as it is or rather as (some think) it ought to be?
None of these questions field clear answers, producing a
kaleidoscope of legal analyses in the Soleimani-case with no indication
of how to assess their respective authority. That picture becomes even
81.

ARSIWA, supra note 4, at 74–5 (“Article 21 leaves open all issues of the
effect of action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.”); Talmon &
Heipertz, supra note 244, at 15.

82.

See e.g., Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 6–7.
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more blurry when branching out to other sections of international law,
as the section below shows.
2. Were the drone strikes in conformity with the jus in bello and/or
international human rights law?

As rightfully pointed out by Christof Heyns, the former UN Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: “For
a particular drone strike to be lawful under international law it must
satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal
regimes.” 83 Moving on, then, from the law on going to war (jus ad
bellum — discussed in the previous section) to the law on waging war
(jus in bello), many commentators wondered whether the drone strikes
that killed General Soleimani triggered (or continued) an international
armed conflict between the United States and Iran/Iraq and were,
therefore, ruled by the jus in bello. 84 Alternatively, the strikes would
have been launched during peacetime, which would then raise the
question whether the U.S. violated its international human rights
obligations by killing no less than 10 individuals, even if that use of
deadly force occurred outside American territory.
Again, there was a wide variety of views among the experts.
Perhaps the most straightforward one held that the strikes ipso facto
initiated an international armed conflict (“IAC”) and therefore fell to
be examined under the rules of JIB. 85 This flows from the so-called ‘first
shot-rule’, which prescribes that “[u]nlike in the case of noninternational armed conflicts, where it must be proved that the
hostilities have reached a certain threshold of intensity … , a single
attack is sufficient to trigger an international armed conflict.” 86 To the
group of experts examining the strikes according to JIB also belong
those who considered (or at least did not exclude the possibility) that
the IAC had been ongoing since the attacks against U.S. troops and
installations in Iraq began in November 2019. 87
83.

Christ of Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13,
2013).

84.

See, e.g., Corten et al., supra note 24, at 15–16.

85.

Corn & Jenks, supra note 24.

86.

Corten et al., supra note 24, at 16; see also Corn & Jenks, supra note 244
(“At a minimum, with the first ‘shot fired’—the first missile the U.S.
launched—an armed conflict between the U.S. and Iran existed.”).

87.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 11–12; Milanovic II, supra note
244 (“It is now also unambiguously clear that, as a matter of international
humanitarian law, an international armed conflict (IAC) exists between
the US and Iran. … It is also perfectly possible that the IAC preceded
Soleimani’s killing, for example due to fighting between the US and
Iranian proxies in Iraq.”).
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Among these experts, some simply concluded that General
Soleimani constituted a legitimate military target: “Where a military
officer in command of the forces and capabilities creating the imminent
threat of armed attack is lawfully and successfully subjected to attack,
the killing was legally justified.” 88 Talmon and Heipertz came to that
same conclusion, 89 albeit after a somewhat more complex reasoning.
While the strikes triggered an (or, in their view, were part of a preexisting) IAC between the U.S. and Iran, the jus in bello was not the
only applicable legal framework. International human rights law would
have to be considered also: “both bodies of law are, in principle,
applicable side by side and are complementary.” 90 However, the authors
denied that Soleimani was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. at the time
he was targeted by American drones. 91 Without such extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the U.S. was not bound to protect Soleimani’s human
rights. 92 And even if that were to be the case, his right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of life was not violated. 93 Given the context of an
international armed conflict, that right must be interpreted in light of
relevant jus in bello standards — as a member of the Iranian armed
forces, Soleimani was an enemy combatant, and thus a legitimate
military target after all. 94
A similar analytical framework was adopted by Corten, Lagerwall,
Koutroulis and Dubuisson: if the strikes “are contrary to the law of
armed conflict, then [they] also constitute an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of
life contrary to article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.” 95 However, unlike their colleagues, they concluded that the
strikes may have contravened JIB for two reasons: (1) No enemy
combatant may be killed perfidiously through an ‘assassination,’ which,
according to some domestic interpretations, prohibits singling out “a

88.

Corn & Jenks, supra note 244. See also Milanovic II, supra note 244 (“To
the extent that IHL applied, both the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian
missile strike in response were lawful, since the attacks were directed at
combatants and military objects, in compliance with the principle of
distinction.”)

89.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 11.

90.

Id. at 12.

91.

Id. at 13.

92.

Id.

93.

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.”) [hereinafter ICCPR].

94.

Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 11–13.

95.

Corten et al, supra note 244, at 21.
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specific person on the adversary’s side and request[ing] his death;” 96 and
(2) Soleimani may have been involved in negotiations between Iran and
Saudi Arabia with Iraqi mediation at the time of his killing. 97 If true,
he was protected from harm given his status as parlementaire. 98 If either
scenario was applicable, the strikes violated JIB and, therefore, IHRL
also.
Other commentators were not satisfied by that framework. Janik,
for example, began by accepting that even isolated targeted killings
could meet the definition of (ultra-short) international armed
conflicts. 99 But relying on the work of Jann Kleffner, he then suggested
that this would not trigger the full body of JIB-rules: “only the
protective dimension of the principle of distinction — the prohibition
to directly target civilians — should be applied to situations of targeted
killings of a foreign state’s armed forces.” 100 Importantly, lethal force
could not be legitimized on the basis of military necessity or
proportionality — leaving such force to be determined exclusively on
the basis of IHRL. 101 Janik then concluded that the U.S. indeed “seems
to have violated [Soleimani’s] right to life.” 102
In yet another approach, Gurmendi first adopts two premises: “(i)
a strike that violated the jus ad bellum is arbitrary and therefor
unlawful under IHRL and … (ii) IHL of IACs applies from the moment
an attack begins with hostile intent, and therefore the first strike will
usually occur after IHL is triggered.” 103 Rather than assessing an
arbitrary deprivation of life on the basis of jus in bello, Gurmendi

96.

Id. at 19–20; see also Rule 65: Perfidy, ICRC, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule65
[https://perma.cc/59X5-A2HK]; John Daniszewski, Was the Drone Attack on
Iranian General an Assassination?, AP NEWS (Jan. 4, 2020),
https://apnews.com/1f914021bc802931059746a5ce8a192e
[https://perma.cc/JQL7-PSYC].

97.

Corten et. al, supra note 24, at 20.

98.

Id. at 20; see also Rule 67: Inviolability of Parlementaires, ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule67
[https://perma.cc/9NB7-37S8].

99.

Janik I, supra note 244.

100. Ralph Janik, Soleimani and Targeted Killings of Enemy Combatants —
Part II: “Geneva Law” versus “Hague Law”, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 20,
2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/20/soleimani-and-targetedkillings-of-enemy-combatants-part-ii-geneva-law-versus-hague-law/
[https://perma.cc/3D7T-TT9E].
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Gurmendi, supra note 244.
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connects it to, and makes it dependent on, the jus ad bellum. 104 As a
result, the two tests apply simultaneously but lead to opposing results:
under JIB the strike is lawful, under JAB (and thus IHRL) it is not.
According to Gurmendi, which test and outcome prevails depends on
the analyst. 105
Finally, the UN Special Rapporteur considered that, on balance,
the jus in bello did not apply at all: “The US and Iran had not been
and have not been considered to be involved in an IAC before or after
the strike and the strike occurred in a civilian setting in an area outside
of active hostilities and in a non-belligerent State.” 106 She came to that
conclusion after considering numerous challenges to the first shot-rule,
such as: (1) taking all incidents between Iran(-supported militias) and
the U.S. into account, it was unclear whether there were dozens of IACs
or a single (on-going) IAC or none at all; (2) most institutional and
individual commentators stopped short of labeling the tensions between
Iran and the U.S. as a fully-fledged armed conflict — as did the States
themselves; (3) the geographical scope of the IAC and, therefore, its
protagonists were uncertain; and (4) while there may be valid and
pragmatic reasons to apply jus in bello in this case, it may not be the
best “‘fit,’ for lack of a better word.” 107 However, unlike Talmon and
Heipertz, Callamard considered that using a drone to take out an
individual abroad was “the ultimate exercise of physical power and
control over the individual.” 108 Consequently, the U.S. was bound by
its human rights obligations even if the action took place on Iraq’s
territory. 109 Moreover, she agreed that an act of aggression involving
the loss of life was necessarily arbitrary. 110 As a result, the “course of
action taken by the US was unlawful.” 111
Again, the discord among commentators was astonishing. All
agreed that to be lawful, the strikes must not have fallen foul of any

104. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 – Article 6:
Right to Life, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 36]. Gurmendi, supra note 24.
105. See Gurmendi, supra note 244. Gurmendi Takes the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission as an example and argues it is likely to take
the ‘pro homine’-approach, allowing IHRL to trump JIB: “As such, faced
with two possible routes to decide a case, the Commission would choose
the one that favors individual rights over state rights. Seen through Latin
American eyes, Soleimani would have been murdered, not targeted.” Id.
106. Callamard, supra note 244, § 39.
107. See id. §§ 15–39.
108. Compare id. § 40–3, with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 13.
109. Callamard, supra note 24, §31.
110. Compare id. § 44, with Gurmendi, supra note 245.
111. Callamard, supra note 24, § 82.
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applicable legal regime. 112 However, some thought that only pertained
to (part of) the jus in bello, while others considered the answer to lie
exclusively in international human rights law. Hybrid views also
existed: certain experts thought both frameworks applied, but whether
the deprivation of life was arbitrary under IHRL fell to be determined
under JIB. 113 Others disagreed, tying IHRL to JAB: an act of aggression
involving souls lost is arbitrary by definition. 114 Finally, there were some
who claimed both frameworks applied, but led to opposing results and
whoever is called upon to assess must decide between the two. 115 The
disagreement by no means ended there. Sub-debates involved the
extraterritorial application of human rights law for targeted drone
strikes, the intensity threshold for IACs, and Soleimani as a(n
i)legitimate military target.
As announced at the outset, this article does not aim to take a
position in that legal debate — difficult as that may be. Rather, the
following sections will launch a preliminary examination into the
question why commentators, whose expertise is beyond reproach,
evaluate a similar set of facts so differently all while claiming to apply
the same set of rules.

III. Tentative explanations
A. International law as a (pseudo)science

Koskenniemi famously wrote that international law is
fundamentally indeterminate and that, as a consequence, it is possible
to “defend any course of action — including deviation from a clear rule
— by professionally impeccable legal arguments.” 116 He further argued
that international law is, therefore, “singularly useless as a means for
justifying or criticizing international behaviour.” 117 His views can be
situated within the critical legal studies (“CLS”) movement that was
introduced into international law by the so-called New Stream in the
1980s. 118 The latter inspired a whole range of new approaches to
international law (“NAILs”), including third-world and feminist

112. See Stuart Casey-Maslen, Pandora’s Box? Drone Strikes Under jus ad
bellum, jus in bello, and International Human Rights Law, 866 INT’L
REV.
OF
THE
RED
CROSS 597, 619
(June
2012); see
also Gurmendi, supra note 24.
113. See generally Corten et al, supra note 244, at 21.
114. See generally Callamard, supra note 24, §44.
115. See generally Gurmendi, supra note 24.
116. MARRTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 591, 591 (2005).
117. Id. at 600.
118. See generally David W. Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law
Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1 (1988).
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critiques of the field. 119 Such critical approaches have since chipped
away at international law’s claims to determinacy, objectivity,
neutrality, impartiality and expertise. 120 Importantly, the “‘newstream’
has become the mainstream” as “critical scholarship is usually taken
far more seriously than doctrinal scholarship.” 121
Additionally, Bianchi compares interpretation in international law
to a game, where the players (or interpreters) must secure adherence
to their own interpretation of the law in order to triumph. 122 These
players have several cards (or interpretive techniques) at their disposal,
but which card to play and when is ultimately “left to the skills and
strategies of the individual players.” 123 Similarly, while international
law accommodates a wide range of theories and methodologies, the
academy now appears to agree that no approach is scientifically
superior to any other — leaving international lawyers completely free
to follow their preferences. 124 As a result, an author may not be
criticized for a methodological choice as such, but criticism is certainly
warranted in case that choice is not made explicitly upfront or its
intrinsic requirements are consequently abandoned. 125

119. See generally JOSE MARIA BENEYTO,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).

ET AL.,

NEW APPROACHES

TO

120. Jason Beckett, Critical International Legal Theory, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0007.xml [https://perma.cc/232YLYSH].
121. Jan Klabbers, Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New
Legal Realism, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 469, 471 (2015). See also Jan
Klabbers, Towards a Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the
Virtues, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 417, 417 (2014).
122. See generally Andrea Bianchi, The Game of Interpretation in
International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35
(Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015).
123. Andrea Bianchi, The Game of Interpretation in International Law, in
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel
Peat & Matthew Windsor eds, 2015). For a different analogy, see Jean
D’Aspremont, Customary International Law as a Dance Floor (Two
Parts), EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 14–15, 2014),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/customary-international-law-as-a-dance-floorpart-i/ [https://perma.cc/69P4-FW3X].
124. See also JEAN D’ASPREMONT, EPISTEMIC FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW — FOUNDATIONAL TECHNIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENTATION 179–80 (2016) (“[T]here is no methodological package
that is, a priori, endowed with more validity or force than another. There
are just a multitude of methodological packages which, in practice, are
endorsed by professionals without any of them having any methodological
or theoretical ascendancy over the other.”).
125. Id.
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Moreover, Orford has argued that “[a] theory of scientific method
is . . . a theory of knowledge . . . is a theory of language and its limits.”126
While the general commitment to scientific values such as rationality
and objectivity may be universal, what that commitment prescribes
concretely in forms of conduct, means of producing knowledge and
relations to the State is by no means static, similar to the continuous
development of language — including that of international law.127
Finally, in a ground-breaking monograph, Roberts collected a vast body
of empirical evidence showing that international law is understood
differently in different States. 128 Employing the same analogy as Orford,
she strikingly concluded that international law is “caught between the
ideal of Esperanto and the reality of both multilingualism and English
as the lingua franca” and is therefore unlikely to ever be fully
“international.” 129
The understanding that international law is inherently
indeterminate, characterized by a methodological free-for-all and
epistemic flux, and its interpretation the result of strategic choices
informed by extralegal factors seems to squarely challenge the
conceptualization of international law as a science by the likes of
Oppenheim with which this article started. 130 It moreover threatens the
law’s legitimacy and may foster noncompliance. 131 Writing in 2019,
Klabbers lamented that the evolution (broadly) sketched out meant
that:
international legal method is no longer about possible ways of
finding out what the law says but, rather, about possible ways of
126. Orford, supra note 8, at 384.
127. Id. at 372.
128. ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 325
(2017).
129. Id.
130. See generally Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its
Task and Method, 2 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 313 (1908).
131. For example, on semantic indeterminacy Franck commented: “But
indeterminacy also has its costs, which are paid in the coin of legitimacy.
Not only do indeterminate normative standards make it harder to know
what is expected—perhaps because the authorities responsible for the rule
text were themselves uncertain, or could not agree, or wished to preserve
flexibility for the future, or just did not see the issue but indeterminacy
also makes it easier to justify non-compliance. To put it conversely, the
more determinate a standard, the more difficult it is to justify noncompliance. Since few persons or states wish to be perceived as acting in
flagrant violation of a generally recognized rule of conduct, they may try
to resolve a conflict between the demands of the rule and their desire for
interest gratification by “interpreting” the rule permissively.” See
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
53–4 (1990).
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doing academic research. International law … is no longer about
what states do, but … about what international lawyers do. … [It]
has become transfixed by methodological debates, with each
faction occupying its own corner and being reluctant to look
outside. 132

The case study under review exemplifies many of those insights.
Admittedly, it may be unrealistic to expect authors to set out their
foundational assumptions — for example on their theoretical and
methodological approach — in detail at the outset of each piece of legal
commentary, especially when destined for the fast-paced blogosphere
(let alone Twittersphere). Regardless, it makes a world of difference
whether, as just one example, an author is mulling the law as it is as
opposed to how (s)he thinks it should be.
Take the opinion of Callamard, expressed in her official capacity as
UN Specially Rapporteur, wherein she firmly derides as an
“anachronism” the view that a targeted, extraterritorial killing carried
out by a State does not engage its human rights obligations. 133 That
interpretation ultimately harkens back to the position adopted by the
U.N. Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) in General Comment 36
(“GC36”). 134 However, the HRC’s Special Rapporteur admitted that
GC36 merely suggested that such an interpretation would indeed be
covered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”). 135 And while the views of the HRC on the ICCPR may
have “great weight,” they “in no way” represent a binding
interpretation of the treaty. 136 The issue here is not with the modalities
of the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application, but rather with its
presentation as settled law by a high-level UN official whose views on
the Soleimani-case have been broadcast around the world. 137
132. Klabbers, supra note 9, at 1062.
133. Callamard, supra note 244, § 43.
134. Id. ¶¶ 40–3. See also General Comment No. 36, supra note 1044.
135. Ryan Goodman, Christof Heyns & Yuval Shany, Human Rights,
Deprivation of Life and National Security: Q&A with Christof Heyns and
Yuval Shany on General Comment 36, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/62467/human-life-national-security-qachristof-heyns-yuval-shany-general-comment-36/
[https://perma.cc/T4LQ-XRV6] (emphasis added). See also ICCPR,
supra note 933.
136. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶
66 (Nov. 30, 2010).
137. Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Expert Deems U.S. Drone Strike on Iran’s
Soleimani an ‘Unlawful’ Killing, REUTERS (July 6, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-un-rights/un-expert-deemsus-drone-strike-on-irans-soleimani-an-unlawful-killing-idUSKBN2472TW
[https://perma.cc/9TZS-ZQ8Q]; US Killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani
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Or take the (currently most popular) blog post on Opinio Juris
wherein Gurmendi bolsters the IHRL-JAB connection, 138 again relying
on GC36 and the work of Haque. 139 The same HRC Special Rapporteur
on this point noted:
The interpretation embraced by the General Comment is that the
term arbitrary deprivation of life in the ICCPR also has to be
construed in light of other relevant norms of international law.
Hence, a loss of life directly resulting from an act or omission in
violation of another relevant norm of international law, such as
the norms of IHL, jus ad bellum or other basic human rights
norms, would be regarded ipso facto as a violation of the right to
life. 140

However, that interpretive move is unsupported by a single source
in GC36. It is unclear how the HRC came to its conclusion and,
consequently, why Gurmendi found that view — as opposed to the
more traditional one connecting IHRL to JIB — to be “the most
convincing.” 141 Again, the issue is not with that position in se, but
rather with its pretense of hard law and the ease with which a
fundamental shift in legal doctrine seems to blow past unopposed.
Another illuminating methodological distinction in the jus ad
bellum specifically was set out by Waxman (and Corten before him)
that sheds more light on the documented cacophony among experts in
the Soleimani-case. 142 According to Waxman,
‘Unlawful’:
UN
Expert,
AL
JAZEERA
(July
7,
2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/killing-iran-qasem-soleimaniunlawful-expert-200707132312296.html [https://perma.cc/7UQ5-VBEE];
Nick Cumming-Bruce, The Killing of Qassim Suleimani Was Unlawful,
TIMES
(July
9,
2020),
Says
U.N.
Expert,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/middleeast/qassimsuleimani-killing-unlawful.html [https://perma.cc/TT7H-T64E].
138. See supra notes 1033–11 and accompanying text.
139. Gurmendi, supra note 244. See also General Comment No. 36, supra note
1044, ¶ 70.
140. Goodman et al., supra note 1355 (emphasis added).
141. Gurmendi, supra note 244.
142. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form
and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 (2013)
[hereinafter Waxman, Form and Substance]; Olivier Corten, The
Controversies over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A
Methodological Debate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 803 (2006). For responses, see
Olivier Corten, Regulating Resort to Force: A Response to Matthew
Waxman from a ‘Bright-Liner’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 191 (2013); Matthew
Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: A Response and Thanks to Corten,
EJIL:TALK! (May 2, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/regulating-resortto-force-a-response-and-thanks-to-corten/comment-page-1/
[https://perma.cc/A5QS-ZP29].
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[t]o Bright-Liners, the legality of resort to force by individual
states or groups of states should operate as an on–off switch,
flipped by the manifestation of readily identifiable factual
preconditions, not shaded or uncertain assessments. . . .
Balancers, by contrast, view legality of resort to force as more
like a dimmer knob than an on–off switch. … Balancers believe
that use of force beyond that authorized by the Security Council
should be regulated by flexible standards that take account of
contextual factors and the various policy interests animating
international law, and that this approach better reflects state
practice. . . . To be clear, these two orientations — Bright-Liners
and Balancers — actually represent segments along a spectrum
of possible views . . . [and] each incorporates some elements of the
other’s preferred form. 143

To some extent, the preference for one over another appears
influenced by the authors’ background and training: “US authors tend
to situate themselves more within the [second] current, the others (most
notably the Europeans) the [first]. The correspondence is by no means
absolute.” 144
One example of that methodological clash in the Soleimani-case is
the discussion about which elements go into the imminence-analysis
pertaining to the right to self-defense. As we have seen, some experts
argued that imminence (at most) relates to the armed attack’s temporal
proximity: has it already begun or is it about to? 145 Others, however,
disagreed and included elements of necessity and causality, using
imminence more as a “rhetorical device than a genuinely useful legal
concept — an armed attack will be regarded as imminent if responding
to the attack is necessary now, regardless of when and how exactly the
attack will take place.” 146 Both approaches appear to find themselves
on opposite sides of Waxman’s spectrum opposing Bright-Liners (onoff switch) and Balancers (dimmer knob). 147
Similarly, the unwilling or unable-test operates as a workaround for
conducting a targeted killing on the territory of a State absent consent
143. Waxman, Form and Substance, supra note 142, at 15–859; see generally
Weil, supra note 3. The description of international law as an “on-off
switch” echoes Weil’s strict distinction between prelegal and legal, id.
144. Corten, supra note 142, at 822; see also Waxman, Form and Substance,
supra note 1422, at 153–54, 158–59. See generally ROBERTS, supra note
128.
145. Unsurprisingly, Corten & others are the most restrictive. Corten et al.,
supra note 24, at 10. See also O’Connell, supra note 244.
146. Milanovic I, supra note 244.
147. See Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law 118
MICH. L. R. 1487, 1490 (2020) (taking firm issue with the so-called
rulebook-conception of customary international law — arguably a concept
more in tune with Bright-Liners).
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and Security Council authorization. According to Callamard, the test
was developed by the U.S. and other States since 9/11 and has been
used to “justify targeting inter alia the Taliban in Afghanistan, and
ISIL in Syria.” 148 Following a balancing approach to the right to selfdefense, it is reasonable to argue in favor of its admissibility if the
defensive military action was necessary to counter a threat at a specific
time and in a specific location, taking into account the territorial
State’s collusion with the enemy. 149 Conversely, a Bright-Liner
considers that such an interpretation is “incompatible both with
existing legal instruments (no text allows such a possibility) and with
the consistent case-law of the International Court of Justice.” 150
Stripping down the respective lines of argumentation thus reveals
a methodological assumption at their core that strategic choices and an
(alleged) indeterminacy of the international legal language inspires151
— often with diametrically opposed outcomes. From this, we may draw
two inferences: first, the influential critical approaches to international
law propagated moving away from the science of international law —
as perhaps most famously described in Oppenheim’s seminal article.152
The logical consequence is that the search for a ‘correct answer on the
law’ is viewed with much suspicion (if not derision). Second, even those
professionals that do not travel down that road — and they are plentiful
too — have become much more tolerant towards the free choice of
theoretical and methodological approach by their peers. As a result,
every interpretation of international law becomes equally defensible,
even if not (necessarily) equally convincing. This much is glaringly
evident from the Soleimani-case.
B. The absence of an authoritative arbiter

The absence of a universally accepted method or institution to
decide between, or (broadly) rank according to authoritativeness, the
multitude of diverging interpretations of international law and their
application to a contentious case reinforces the foregoing. It seems as if
all interpretations may stand, resulting in the ever-greater
fragmentation of international law. 153 Nor is there an international
148. Callamard, supra note 24, ¶ 72.
149. Milanovic I, supra note 244; Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 245, at 14.
150. Corten et al., supra note 244, at 9.
151. In this case, the indeterminacy could involve the term “imminence,” or
may be found in the formulation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. U.N.
Charter art. 51 (“Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”) (emphasis added).
152. See generally Oppenheim, supra note 1.
153. See generally Martii Koskenniemi (Chairman of the Int’l Law Comm’n),
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
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arbiter capable of taking on that fateful role. Even the International
Court of Justice, which comes closest, 154 is fully dependent on States’
consent to decide a dispute between them and take that opportunity to
clarify outstanding international legal issues (often in obiter dicta).155
Moreover, relatively speaking such judgments by the ICJ (or any other
international court, for that matter) are few and far between. 156
However, the ICJ does rely on “judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 157 Generally,
and in the abstract, it is (supposed to be) the soundness,
trustworthiness and persuasiveness — or, in a word, quality — of those
subsidiary sources that determines their influence on international
law. 158 The U.S. Supreme Court in Paquete Habana case phrased it as
follows:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction .
. . . For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be,
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 159

In addition, the “teachings” of expert bodies with a globally diverse
composition, with the International Law Commission as a prime

154. See Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 858 (Andreas Zimmermann et al.,
eds., 2nd ed. 2012) (“[T]he Court remains the most prestigious of all and
the only one having a general competence for all legal disputes . . . ; its
status as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations enhances its
authority as does its composition, both wide . . . and diversified . . . ; its
organic permanence and precedence in time has enabled the Court to
elaborate an impressive case law without equal.”)
155. U.N. Charter art. 36.
156. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) for one particularly powerful
example of the fact that much of our contemporary understanding of the
jus ad bellum still relies on the judgment of the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua
case.
157. Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 38(1)(d), 24 October 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
158. See Pellet, supra note 1544, at 856 (quoting Von Bogdandy, The Judge
as Law-Maker: Thoughts on Bruno Simma’s Declaration in the Kosovo
Opinion, in Fastenrath).
159. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).
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example, carries a greater weight than those of individual scholars.160
Nevertheless, the work of such a collective often takes years before
wrapping up. After all, rather than provide play-by-play commentary,
these institutions play the long game. Furthermore, their views are not
always adopted by consensus (internal disagreement), 161 may contradict
those adopted by colleagues (external disagreement), 162 and also do not
always clearly distinguish between the codification of international law
and its progressive development. 163
D’Aspremont pointedly described the state of affairs as follows:
“the intellectual prison of custom seems to be gradually transformed
into a large dance floor where (almost) every step and movement is
allowed or, at least, tolerated.” 164 While he was commenting specifically
on international custom as a primary source of international law, 165 the
same can be said to apply to (sources of) the field more broadly.
Arguably, the lack of a fire-proof way to distinguish between
authoritative and speculative interpretations fuels this phenomenon.
And again, the Soleimani-case supports these concerns. For
example, commentators were willing to judge the official U.S.
justifications on their own merits — even if the standards they invoked
did not accurately reflect international law. Milanovic confronted the
U.S. position on self-defense head-on by proceeding “for the sake of the
argument, on the assumption that these expansive positions [espoused
by the U.S.] are correct.” 166 He concluded that “even if we took the US
views of applicable international law on their own terms, . . . it would
160. See Membership, INT’L L. COMM’N.
https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml [https://perma.cc/7CNRAXUW].
161. See Georg Nolte, The Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on
Military Assistance on Request, 45 REVUE BELGE [BELG.] DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL [INT’L] 241 (2012).
162. Compare Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, INT’L L.
ASS’N (2010),
http://www.rulac.org/assets/downloads/ILA_report_armed_conflict_2
010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HUN-D232],u with Commentary of 2016 –
Article 2: Application of the Convention, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS
(2016), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocume
nt&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518
[https://perma.cc/SLV2-TUNC]. For the treatment of the comparable
‘decisional fragmentation’ among international courts and tribunals, see
PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND
FRAGMENTATION (2013).
163. This is a reference to the ILC’s twofold task. See G.A. Res 174(II), at art.
15 (Nov. 21, 1947).
164. D’Aspremont, supra note 1233 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. Milanovic I, supra note 244 (emphasis added).
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be difficult to argue that the killing of Soleimani was lawful.”167
Therefore, while he thought it unlikely that the U.S. could discharge
its evidentiary burden, it was “not inconceivable that it could do so”
and the “Soleimani strike [was] thus not clearly unlawful in the way
some previous military actions of the Trump administration have
been.” 168 Taken together, it remains unclear what legal standard of selfdefense Milanovic himself espouses given his refusal to take a firm
stance in the debate. 169 On the contrary, Labuda noted upfront that his
analysis took “for granted the expansionist ius ad bellum doctrine
known as ‘unable or unwilling’ (U/U)” even if “[t]he better view is that
this controversial doctrine is rejected by most states.” 170 Nevertheless,
he then considered that “since the US is one of its proponents, I examine
the doctrine’s potential applicability in this post.” 171
But do these thought experiments, reasoning along with a
justification that the commentator considers problematic under
international law (to say the least), not inadvertently bolster its
authoritativeness? After all, the influential report by the UN Special
Rapporteur did not dismiss the unwilling or unable-test outright and
merely admitted that “the support for this doctrine is mixed, but it has
been used to justify the use of military force,” and then continued her
analysis with “[e]ven if valid, the ‘unwilling and unable’ doctrine does
not justify the strike within Iraq.” 172
Perhaps, that laissez-faire attitude and refusal to disregard a
clearly outlandish reading of the law may reinforce the questionable or
even pernicious view that in the interpretation and application of
international law “everything goes,” indeed. 173

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Labuda, supra note 244.
171. Id.
172. See Callamard, supra note 24, §§ 72–3 (reasoning with expansive
interpretations of the controversial unwilling or unable-test, put forth by
wayward States and taken seriously by authors) with Corten, supra note
24, at 9 and Talmon, supra note 24, at 15. A comparable, but equally
problematic, analytical move takes the official State justification too
literally. For example, both Haque and Callamard (supra note 24) first
note that the U.S. justification refers to “Iran-supported militias” and
then use that formulation to deny possible attribution of militia actions
to Iran as “‘assistance … in the form … of weapons or logistical or other
support’ does not constitute an armed attack.” But by taking the official
justification at face value, commentators may miss the chance to address
the legal issue at the crux of the case. Haque, supra note 24; Callamard,
supra note 24.
173. See generally D’Aspremont, supra note 123.
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C. Academic idiosyncrasies

Finally, it is worth considering a more general and pragmatic
explanation for the fundamental discord among expert commentators
in case studies such as the one under review. Indeed, perhaps the
requirements imposed by modern-day academia, to zoom in on just one
type of commentator, unavoidably lead to a dizzying variety of views
including on the (substance and application of some of the) law’s most
foundational norms. For example, Klabbers insightfully noted that:
The system of incentives that has been put into place over the
last couple of decades, with its emphasis on quick fixes, on
quantity and on impact, not only stimulates particular ways of
doing academic work but also stimulates a particular ethos. That
ethos is one of drama — high drama. In order to be successful,
grand claims and big promises must be made. … Research projects
cannot be proposed merely because one is interested in figuring
things out; the least that is expected is the promise of a ‘paradigm
shift’. 174

In addition, Sassòli assessed that the importance of scholarly
writings has diminished. 175 His appreciation of its causes is remarkably
similar to that of Klabbers and, as they support many of the arguments
made above, it deserves to be reproduced in some detail:
[A]n academic career cannot be pursued by honestly describing
the existing law, but only by suggesting ‘new interpretations’,
‘thinking outside the box’ or ‘deconstructing’ everything written
previously. This leads to the impression that a reference may be
found in favour of any position. The increasing number of
publications on every imaginable IHL problem, the race in the
academic world towards a quantitative evaluation of research
output useful for a career and the need to raise funds for research
by imagining innovative projects that claim a ‘paradigm shift’ is
needed all reinforce this tendency. . . . [S]cholars following some
contemporary schools of international law often proudly refuse to
state whether their positions reflect lex lata or lex ferenda as they
consider this distinction to be outdated and irrelevant. 176

Consequently, the intense incentive to produce as much scholarship
as possible may actually cause the decline of its respective impact. This
is what D’Aspremont — always great in coming up with a fitting
moniker — describes as leading to a “wasteland of academic
174. Klabbers, supra note 9, at 1066.
175. MARCO SASSÒLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES,
CONTROVERSIES, AND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE
§§ 4.79–80 (2019).
176. See id.
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overproduction.” 177 Weiler concurs and laments that “everybody is so
busy writing these days, publishing, self-publishing and then selfpromoting … that hardly any time is left for . . . serious, reflective
reading.” 178 Even more dramatically, he believes that this imposes an
“immense, self-defeating pressure” on young scholars. 179
Perhaps these are nothing more than loosely connected
observations — albeit made by giants in the field of international law.
Nevertheless, the combination of sustained pressure on early-career
academics to be quantitatively productive above all else and overthrow,
rather than build upon, established doctrines in international law for
professional advancement 180 indeed helps to better understand the
explosion of views on some of its most cardinal principles. Perversely,
in the long-term this may lead to the diminished impact of legal
scholars. However, none of that should be interpreted as a defense of
engrained notions of international law on moral or otherwise principled
grounds. Quite the contrary, convincingly arguing for the progressive
development of international law first necessitates a clear-eyed
understanding of the law as it stands today. After all, as insightfully
put by Hart, “[a] concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to
be distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity
and variety of these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law
which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them.”181
Conflating those roles would be putting the cart before the horse and
undermines the persuasiveness of any suggested reform from the getgo.

IV. Conclusion
The issues identified in this article will likely not come as a shock
to members of the international legal community and, perhaps, the
international legal community will not think they are problematic at
all. Doctoral students are warned against gearing research towards
177. Jean D’Aspremont, Destination: The Wasteland of Academic
Overproduction, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 3, 2020);
https://www.ejiltalk.org/destination-the-wasteland-of-academicoverproduction-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/29D9-HKH9].
178. Joseph Weiler, On My Way Out – Advice to Young Scholars II: Career
Strategy and the Publication Trap, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/on-my-way-out-advice-to-young-scholars-iicareer-strategy-and-the-publication-trap/ [https://perma.cc/4PEZE94G].
179. Joseph Weiler, Publish and Perish: A Plea to Deans, Faculty
Chairpersons, University Authorities, BLOG EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/publish-and-perish-a-plea-to-deans-facultychairpersons-university-authorities/ [https://perma.cc/JZG2-DS4D].
180. Id.; see also SASSÒLI, supra note 175; see D’Aspremont, supra note 177.
181. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 211 (3rd ed. 2012).
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clarifying the substance of a primary rule of international law, as such
research would run the risk of being undercut by equally convincing
argumentation — the law is indeterminate after all. 182 That message is
ubiquitous and research that plainly describes, elucidates or specifies
the law is often considered outmoded, erroneous, and, frankly, just not
that interesting. 183
Be that as it may, this article takes the position that the current
state of affairs is no cause for celebration either. Indeed, with the
spectacular divide on the legal appraisal of such visible and
controversial State action as the killing of Qasem Soleimani by the
United States, 184 the authority of international lawyers is fundamentally
conquered. When international lawyers as a professional class fail in
their primary task to determine with precision whether contentious
State conduct is or is not in accordance with the edicts of international
law and, consequently, does or does not entail international
responsibility, States have their choice of expert to cover their actions
under a veneer of legality. This reduces international law to a fig leaf
for power politics, making it impossible to meaningfully impact State
behavior. 185
182. Koskenniemi, supra note 116, at 591. See generally Martti Koskenniemi,
What is Critical Research in International Law? Celebrating
Structuralism, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 727 (2016).
183. Jörg Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism, OXFORD HANDBOOK
THEORY INT’L L. 407 (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman eds., 2016) (“No
fashion-conscious international lawyer would be caught dead espousing
positivism.”).
184. See, e.g., Merrit Kennedy & Jackie Northam, Was It Legal for the U.S.
to Kill a Top Iranian Military Leader?, NPR, Jan. 4, 2020,
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793412105/was-it-legal-for-the-u-s-tokill-a-top-iranian-military-leader [https://perma.cc/JTA4-5JRA].
185. See, e.g., Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro & Tim Haesebrouck, Parliamentary
War Powers and the Role of International Law in Foreign Troop
Deployment Decisions: The US-led Coalition Against “Islamic States” in
Iraq and Syria, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 118, 138–9 (2019) (discussing the
debate in the Belgian Parliament on the decision to expand military
operations against the so-called Islamic State from Iraq to Syria, with
opposing parties relying on contradicting legal scholarship on the
unwilling or unable-test). See also Lisa O’Carroll, Government Admits
New Brexit Bill “Will Break International Law”, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
8,
2020), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/08/governmentadmits-new-brexit-bill-will-break-internationallaw [https://perma.cc/GLB9-CH7K] (discussing the bald-faced
admission by the government of the United Kingdom that it would
break international law “in a very specific and limited way” through a
reinterpretation of the special Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson noted such action was necessary to guard
against the EU’s “‘proven willingness’ to interpret aspects of the
agreement in ‘absurd’ ways, ‘simply to exert leverage’ in the trade
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It may go without saying that the reasons underlying the discord
among international lawyers require more in-depth examination and
research than was possible in a single conference contribution.
Hopefully, however, touching upon some of them here — i.e.,
methodological and theoretical libertarianism, epistemic egalitarianism,
and academic industrialism — can help to ignite a much-needed debate
on the issue. In the end, Koskenniemi is also famous for his statement
that international law is “what international lawyers do and how they
think about what they are doing.” 186 But perhaps it is time to consider
the opposite point of view and let the law again take precedence over
the lawyer.

talks.” That position would be bad enough in itself but was justified by
the understanding of top legal officers that “an established principle of
international law is subordinate to the much more fundamental principle
of parliamentary sovereignty.”). Paul Lewis &
Owen Bowcott, Government’s Top Legal Advisers Divided over Move to
Override Brexit Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10,
2020), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/10/governments
-top-legal-advisers-divided-over-move-to-override-brexitdeal [https://perma.cc/Z2LJ-SJM9]. Brexit: Boris Johnson Says Powers
Will Ensure UK Cannot Be “Broken Up”, BBC NEWS (Sept. 14,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics54153302 [https://perma.cc/F54U-MED3].
186. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16 AUST.
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 17 (1995).
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